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ABSTRACT
Many argue that home bias arises because home investors can predict home asset payoffs
more accurately than foreigners can. But why doesn’t global information access eliminate this
asymmetry? We model investors, endowed with a small home information advantage, who choose
what information to learn before they invest. Surprisingly, even when home investors can learn
what foreigners know, they choose not to: Investors profit more from knowing information others
do not know. Learning amplifies information asymmetry. The model matches patterns of local
and industry bias, foreign investments, portfolio out-performance and asset prices. Finally, we
propose new avenues for empirical research.
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Observed returns on national equity portfolios suggest substantial benefits from international
diversification, yet individuals and institutions in most countries hold modest amounts of foreign
equity. Many studies document such home bias (see French and Poterba (1991), Tesar and Werner
(1998) and Ahearne, Griever and Warnock (2004)). While restrictions on international capital
flows may have been a viable explanation for the home bias thirty years ago, they no longer are
today. An alternative hypothesis contends that home investors have superior access to information
about domestic firms or economic conditions. This information-based theory of the home bias
embeds the implicit assumption that home investors cannot learn about foreign firms. It replaces
the old assumption of capital immobility by the similar assumption of information immobility.
Our critique of this information-based theory of home bias is that domestic investors are free to
learn about foreign firms. Such cross-border information flows could potentially undermine the
home bias. In sum, when investors can choose which information to collect, initial information
advantages could disappear.
Most existing models of asymmetric information in financial markets are silent on information
choice.1 A small but growing literature studies how much information investors acquire about one
risky asset or models a representative agent who, by definition, cannot have asymmetric informa-
tion.2 Instead of asking how much investors learn, we ask which assets they learn about. To answer
this question requires a model with three features: information choice, multiple risky assets to learn
about, and heterogeneous agents so that information asymmetry is possible.
1Recent work on asymmetric information in financial markets includes Banerjee (2007), Ozdenoren and Yuan
(2007) and Yuan (2005). The canonical reference on asymmetric information with multiple assets is Admati (1985).
Work on asymmetric information and the home bias, in particular, includes Pastor (2000), Brennan and Cao (1997)
and Portes, Rey and Oh (2001).
2Recent work on information choice in finance includes Peress (2006) and Dow, Goldstein and Guembel (2007).
The canonical references in this literature, Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and Admati and Pfleiderer (1990), are
also about one risky asset. Our paper also differs from Calvo and Mendoza (2000) who argue that more scope for
international diversification decreases the value of information. Our paper shows the converse: When investors can
choose what to learn about, the value of diversification declines.
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We develop a two-country, rational expectations, general equilibrium model where investors
first choose what home or foreign information to acquire, and then choose what assets to hold. The
prior information home investors have about each home asset’s payoff is slightly more precise than
the prior information foreigners have. The reverse is true for foreign assets. This prior information
advantage may reflect what is incidentally observed from the local environment. Home investors
choose whether to acquire additional information about either home or foreign asset payoffs. The
interaction of the information decision and the portfolio decision causes home investors to acquire
information that magnifies their comparative advantage in home assets.
If home investors undo their information asymmetry by learning about foreign assets, they
sacrifice excess returns. When information indicates that the foreign assets’ payoffs will be high,
both home and foreign investors know about it, demand more of the foreign assets, and bid up
their price. If home investors instead learn more about home assets than the average investor does,
then when they observe information indicating high home asset payoffs, home asset prices will not
fully reflect this information. Prices reflect only as much as the the average investor knows. The
difference between prices and expected payoffs generates home investors’ expected excess return.
When choosing what to learn, investors make their information set as different as possible from
the average investor’s. To achieve the maximum difference, home investors take home assets, which
they start out knowing relatively more about, and specialize in learning even more about them.
The main result in the first half of the paper is that information immobility persists not because
investors cannot learn what locals know, nor because it is expensive, but because they do not
choose to; specializing in what they already know is a more profitable strategy. Having shown that
sustaining information asymmetry is possible, the second half of the paper compares the testable
predictions of the model to the data.
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The model’s key mechanism is the interaction between the information choice and the investment
choice. To illustrate its importance, section II shuts down this interaction by forcing investors to
take their portfolios as given, when they choose what to learn. These investors minimize investment
risk by learning about assets that they are most uncertain about. With sufficient capacity, learning
undoes all initial information advantage, and therefore all home bias. Thus, this model embodies
the logic that the asymmetric information criticisms are founded on.
Section III shows that when investors have rational expectations about their future optimal
portfolio choices, this logic is reversed. While acquiring information that others do not know
increases expected portfolio returns, that alone does not imply that home investors take a long
position in home assets, only that they take a large position. Home bias, a long position in the
home asset that exceeds what is prescribed by the standard world market portfolio, arises because
home assets offer risk-adjusted expected excess returns to informed home investors. Information
about the home asset reduces the risk or uncertainty that the asset poses without reducing its
return, hence the high risk-adjusted returns. How does information reduce uncertainty? An asset’s
payoff may be very volatile, high one period and low the next. But if an investor has information
that tells him when the payoff is high and when it is low, the asset payoff is not very uncertain to
that investor. Information drives a wedge between the conditional standard deviation (uncertainty
or risk) and the unconditional standard deviation (volatility) of asset payoffs. While foreign assets
offer lower risk-adjusted returns to home investors, they are still held for diversification purposes.
The optimal portfolio tilts the world market portfolio towards home assets.
Considering how learning affects portfolio risk offers an alternative way of understanding why
investors with an initial information advantage in home assets choose to learn more about home
assets. Because of the excess risk-adjusted returns, a home investor with a small information
3
advantage initially expects to hold slightly more home assets than a foreign investor would. This
small initial difference is amplified because information has increasing returns in the value of the
asset it pertains to: as the investor decides to hold more of the asset, it becomes more valuable to
learn about. So, the investor chooses to learn more and hold more of the asset, until all his capacity
to learn is exhausted on his home asset.
A variety of evidence supports the model’s predictions. Section IV connects the theory to facts
about analyst forecasts, portfolio patterns, excess portfolio returns, cross-sectional asset prices, as
well as evidence thought to be incompatible with an information-based home bias explanation. In
particular, the theory offers a unified explanation of home bias and local bias. While we cannot
claim for any one of these facts that no other theory could possibly explain the same relationship,
taken together, they constitute a large body of evidence that is consistent with one parsimonious
theory. A numerical example shows that learning can magnify the home bias considerably. When
all home investors get a small initial advantage in all home assets, the home bias is between 5 and
46%, depending on the magnitude of investors’ learning capacity. When each home investor gets
an initial information advantage that is concentrated in one local asset, the home bias is amplified.
It rises as high as the 76% home bias in U.S. portfolio data, for a level of capacity that is consistent
with observed excess returns on local assets. Finally, we derive new testable hypotheses from the
model to guide future empirical work.
Information advantages have been used to explain exchange rate fluctuations (Evans and Lyons
(2005), Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2006)), the international consumption correlation puzzle (Co-
val (2003)), international equity flows (Brennan and Cao (1997)), a bias towards investing in local
stocks (Coval and Moskowitz (2001)), and the own-company stock puzzle (Boyle, Uppal and Wang
(2003)). Information asymmetry also sustains other home bias explanations, such as ambiguity
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aversion (Uppal and Wang (2003)). All of these explanations are bolstered by our finding that
information advantages are not only sustainable when information is mobile, but that asymmetry
can be amplified when investors can choose what to learn.
I A Model of Learning and Investing
Using tools from information theory, we construct an equilibrium framework to consider learning
and investment choices jointly. This model uses the one-investor partial-equilibrium problem of
Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2008) to build a heterogeneous-agent, two-country general equi-
librium model with a continuum of investors in each country. This is a static model which we break
up into 3 periods. In period 1, each investor chooses the distribution from which to draw signals
about the payoff of the assets, subject to a constraint on the total informativeness of their signals.
In period 2, each investor observes signals from the chosen distribution and makes his investment.
Prices are set such that the market clears. In period 3, he receives the asset payoffs and consumes.
Preferences Investors, with absolute risk aversion parameter ρ, facing anN×1 vector of unknown
asset payoffs f a risk-free rate r and asset prices p, maximize their mean-variance utility:
U = −E
[
−ρq′(f − rp) + ρ
2
2
q′Σ̂q
]
. (1)
where q is the N × 1 vector of quantities of each asset the investor decides to hold and Σ̂ is the
uncertainty about payoffs that investors face after they learn.3 When portfolios are chosen in
period 2, the expectation E is conditional on the realization of the signals the investor has chosen
3A separate appendix discusses the foundations for this utility formulation in detail. Also, the results do not
depend on the existence of a risk-free asset. Suppose investors can consume c1 at the investment date and c2 when
asset payoffs are realized. If preferences are defined over rc1 + c2, where r is the rate of time preference, the solution
will be identical. The earlier consumption choice takes the place of the riskless investment choice.
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to see. When signals are chosen at time 1, the investor does not know what the realizations of these
signals will be. Therefore, in period 1, the investor has the same objective, except that expectation
E conditions only on information in prior beliefs. This utility function comes from an exponential
form of utility over terminal wealth. Terminal wealth equals initial wealth W0, plus the profit
earned from portfolio investments:
W = rW0 + q′(f − pr) (2)
Initial information Two countries, home and foreign, have an equal-sized continuum of in-
vestors, whose preferences are identical. Investors are endowed with prior beliefs about a vector of
asset payoffs f . Each investor’s prior belief is an unbiased, independent draw from a normal distri-
bution, whose variance depends on where the investor resides. Home prior beliefs are µ ∼ N(f,Σ).
Foreign prior beliefs are distributed µ? ∼ N(f,Σ?). Home investors have lower-variance prior
beliefs for home assets and foreign investors have lower-variance beliefs for foreign assets. One
interpretation is that each investor gets a free signal about each asset in his home country. We will
call this difference in prior variances a group’s initial information advantage.
Information acquisition Each investor knows the true mean and variance of asset payoffs. The
only unknown is the realization of those payoffs f , which is what the investor can learn about. Just
like an econometrician, he can acquire additional data to form a more accurate payoff estimate µˆ.
The investor chooses what assets to collect data on, subject to a constraint on the total amount of
data. Collecting more data on one asset reduces the standard error of his estimate for that asset’s
payoff. The posterior variance is that standard error, squared.
At time 2, each investor will observe an N ×1 vector of signal realizations η about the vector of
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asset payoffs f . At time 1, investors choose a variance Ση such that η ∼ N(f,Ση). Investors cannot
choose whether signals will contain good or bad news. Rather, they choose signals that will contain
more precise information about some assets than others. Each investor’s signal is independent of
the signals drawn by other investors.
When payoffs co-vary, obtaining a signal about one asset’s payoff is informative about other
payoffs. To describe what a signal is about, it is useful to decompose asset payoff risk into orthogonal
risk factors and the risk of each factor. This decomposition breaks the prior variance-covariance
matrix Σ up into a diagonal eigenvalue matrix Λ, and an eigenvector matrix Γ: Σ = ΓΛΓ′. The
Λi’s are the prior variances of each risk factor i. The ith column of Γ (denoted Γi) contains the
loadings of each asset on the ith risk factor. To make aggregation tractable, we assume that home
and foreign prior variances Σ and Σ? have the same eigenvectors, but different eigenvalues. In other
words, home and foreign investors use their capacity to reduce different initial levels of uncertainty
about the same set of risks. This assumption implies that investors observe signals (Γ′η) about
risk factor payoffs (Γ′f). Learning about risk factors (principal components analysis) has long
been used in financial research and among practitioners. It approximates risk categories investors
might study: country risk, business cycle risk, industry, regional, and firm-specific risk. Nothing
prevents investors from learning about many risk factors. The only thing this rules out is signals
with correlated information about independent risks.
Choosing how much to learn about each risk factor is equivalent to choosing the variance of each
entry of the N × 1 signal vector Γ′η. Since the signal is unbiased, its mean is Γ′f . The variance of
a principal component is its eigenvalue. So, reducing uncertainty about the ith risk factor means
choosing a smaller ith eigenvalue of the signal variance-covariance matrix Ση. Signals about the
payoffs of all assets that load on risk factor i become more accurate. With Bayesian updating, each
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Ση results in a unique posterior variance matrix that measures the investor’s uncertainty about
asset payoffs, after incorporating what he learned. Since the mapping between signal choices and
posteriors is unique, information choice is the same as choosing posterior variance, without loss of
generality. Since sums, products and inverses of prior and signal variance matrices have eigenvectors
Γ, posterior beliefs will as well. Denoting posterior beliefs with a hat, Σ̂ = ΓΛˆΓ′, where Γ is given
and the diagonal eigenvalue matrix Λˆ is the choice variable. The decrease in risk factor i’s posterior
variance (Λi − Λˆi) measures the decrease in uncertainty achieved through learning.
There are 2 constraints governing how the investor can choose his signals about risk factors. The
first is the capacity constraint ; it limits the quantity of information investors can observe. Grossman
and Stiglitz (1980) used the ratio of variances of prior and posterior beliefs to measure the quality of
information about one risky asset. We generalize this metric to a multi-signal setting by bounding
the ratio of the generalized prior variance to the generalized posterior variance, |Σ̂| ≥ 1K |Σ|, where
generalized variance is defined as the determinant of the variance-covariance matrix. Capacity
K ≥ 1 measures how much an investor can decrease the uncertainty he faces. For now, K is the
same for all investors. Since determinants are a product of eigenvalues, the capacity constraint is
∏
i
Λˆi ≥ 1
K
∏
i
Λi. (3)
The second constraint is the no negative learning constraint : the investor cannot choose to
increase uncertainty (forget information) about some risks to free up more capacity to decrease
uncertainty about other risks. We rule this out by requiring the variance-covariance matrix of the
signal vector Ση = ΓΛηΓ′, to be positive semi-definite. Since a matrix is positive semi-definite when
8
all its eigenvalues are positive, the constraint is:
Ληi ≥ 0 ∀ i. (4)
This constraint implies that Λˆ−1i ≥ Λ−1i + Λ−1pi , ∀i.
Comments on the learning technology The structure we put on the learning problem keeps
it as simple as possible. But many of these assumptions can be relaxed. First, our results do not
hinge on the assumption that investors learn about principal components of asset payoffs. Investors
specialize in what they know well, for any arbitrary risk factor structure. Second, our framework
can incorporate capacity which differs across investors (see section IV.C). Third, allowing agents
to choose how much capacity to acquire does not change the results. Any cost function increasing
in K has an equivalent capacity endowment that produces identical portfolio outcomes. Finally, a
learning technology with diminishing returns and un-learnable risk will moderate, but not overturn,
our results. Instead of specializing in one risk, investors may learn about a limited set of risks. But
it does not change the conclusion that investors prefer to learn about what they already have an
advantage in.4
It is not true that every capacity constraint preserves specialization. We use this one because it
is a common distance measure in econometrics (a log likelihood ratio) and in statistics (a Kullback-
Liebler distance); it is a bound on entropy reduction, an information measure with a long history
in information theory (Shannon (1948)); it can be interpreted as a technology for reducing mea-
surement error (Hansen and Sargent (2001)); it is a measure of information complexity (Cover and
Thomas (1991)); it has been used to forecast foreign exchange returns (Glodjo and Harvey (1994)),
4The proof of the first and third claims can be found in the separate appendix, the proof of the last claim is in
Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2008).
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and it has been used to describe limited information processing ability in economic settings by
(Sims (2003)).5 Although we do not prove this is the correct learning technology, our strategy is to
work out its predictions for international investment choices and ask whether they are consistent
with the data.
Updating beliefs When investors’ portfolios are fixed (section II), what investors learn does not
affect the market price. But when asset demand responds to observed information (section III),
the market price is an additional noisy signal of this aggregated information. Using their prior
beliefs, their chosen signals, and information contained in prices, investors form posterior beliefs
about asset payoffs, using Bayes’ law.
The information in prices depends on portfolio choices. Appendix B shows that prices p are
linear functions of the true asset payoffs such that (rp−A) ∼ N(f,Σp), for some constant A.
An investor j’s posterior belief about the asset payoff f , conditional on a prior belief µj , signal
ηj ∼ N(f,Σjη), and prices, is formed using Bayesian updating. The posterior mean is a weighted
average of the prior, the signal and price information, while the posterior variance is a harmonic
mean of the prior, signal, and price variances:
µˆj ≡ E[f |µj , ηj , p] = ((Σj)−1 + (Σjη)−1 +Σ−1p )−1 ((Σj)−1µj + (Σjη)−1ηj +Σ−1p (rp−A)) (5)
Σˆj ≡ V [f |µj , ηj , p] = ((Σj)−1 + (Σjη)−1 +Σ−1p )−1 . (6)
We emphasize that acquiring information ((Σjη)−1 > 0) always reduces posterior variance. This
5 This learning technology is also used in models of rational inattention. However, that work has focused on
time-series phenomena in representative investor models such as delayed response to shocks, inertia, time to digest,
and consumption smoothing. See e.g. Sims (2003) and Moscarini (2004). Instead, we focus on the interactions of
heterogeneous investors’ learning choices.
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might appear puzzling because in an econometric setting, new data can make us revise variance
estimates upward. The difference is that there is no estimation of variance in our problem. The
true variance of f is known to all investors. Rather, Σ̂ is the variance of the estimate of f . It is
a measure of uncertainty, a posterior variance which conditions on the investor’s information, not
of volatility (prior variance). Under Bayes’ law with normal random variables, more information
always reduces uncertainty.6
Market clearing Asset prices p are determined by market clearing. The per-capita supply of
the risky asset is x¯+x, a positive constant (x¯ > 0) plus a random (n× 1) vector with known mean
and variance, and zero covariance across assets: x ∼ N(0, σ2xI). The reason for having a risky asset
supply is to create some noise in the price level that prevents investors from being able to perfectly
infer the private information of others. Without this noise, no information would be private, and
no incentive to learn would exist. We interpret this extra source of randomness in prices as due to
liquidity or life-cycle needs of traders. The market clears if investors’ portfolios qj sum to the asset
supply:
∫ 1
0 q
jdj = x¯+ x.
Definition of Equilibrium An equilibrium is a set of asset demands, asset prices and informa-
tion choices, such that three conditions are satisfied. First, given prior information about asset
payoffs f ∼ N(µ,Σ), each investor’s information choice Λˆ and portfolio choice q maximize (1),
subject to capacity (3), no-negative-learning (4) and budget constraints (2). Second, asset prices
are set such that the asset market clears. Third, beliefs are updated, using Bayes’ law (5 and 6)
and expectations are rational: Period-1 beliefs about the portfolio q are consistent with the true
distribution of the optimal q.
6Our model does not distinguish between risk and uncertainty because the probability of each of the states of
nature is known.
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II Why Might Asymmetric Information Disappear?
Returns to specialization come from the interaction of the investment choice and the learning choice.
To highlight the importance of this interaction, we first explore a model where it is shut down. The
only difference with the main model in section III is that investors do not account for the fact
that what they learn will influence the portfolio they hold. They take their portfolio as given and
choose what to learn, in order to minimize its risk. In this setting, investors learn exclusively about
the most uncertain assets until either they run out of capacity, or are equally uncertain about all
assets. Learning undoes initial information advantages and reduces or eliminates home bias. As
Lewis (1999) put it, “Greater uncertainty about foreign returns may induce the investor to pay
more attention to the data and allocate more of his wealth to foreign equities.” This section explains
the basis for this criticism of information-based models of the home bias.
In order to shut down the investment-learning interaction, we assume that the investor takes
the vector of asset holdings q as given and expected to hold the same amount of each risk factor:
Γ′iq = Γ
′
kq, ∀i, k. The objective (1) collapses to choosing Λˆi’s to minimize
∑
i(Γ
′
iq)
2Λˆi, subject to
the capacity constraint (3) and the no-forgetting constraint (4). The following result shows that
learning undoes initial information asymmetry. The proofs of this and all subsequent propositions
are in appendix A.
Proposition 1. Information Acquisition in a Model without Increasing Returns to In-
formation. There exists a threshold K? such that, if capacity is K ≥ K?, then the optimal
information allocation choice for an investor who takes asset holdings q as given is to set Λˆi =M
for all risk factors i ∈ {1, · · · , N}, for some constant M > 0, irrespective of his initial information
advantage. If K < K?, then Λˆi = min{Λi,M}.
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The proposition states that an investor who believes that he will hold equal amounts of each
home and foreign risk factor, optimally chooses to equate the posterior variance across all risk factors
(to some target varianceM), given enough capacityK?. With high enough learning capacity, having
an initial advantage in home or foreign risk will result in the same the same posterior variances for
both home and foreign assets. Learning choices compensate for initial information advantage in
such a way as to render the nature of the initial advantage irrelevant. Any home bias that might
result from the information advantage disappears when investors can learn.
On the other hand, if capacity is sufficiently low, then equating posterior precisions on all assets
is not feasible. The no-forgetting constraint prevents the investor from reducing her information
about the home assets to free up capacity to learn about the foreign assets. The constrained
optimum is to set posterior variances equal as much as possible. This allocation implies devoting
capacity to the most uncertain risk factor first. For a home investor with an initial advantage
in home risk factors and small capacity, this means using all capacity to learn about foreign risk
factors. Therefore, initial information advantages could persist if capacity were low relative to the
initial advantage. However, if this explanation were true, individuals would never choose to learn
about home assets; they would devote what little information capacity they had entirely to learning
about foreign assets. This implication seems inconsistent with the multi-billion-dollar industry that
analyzes U.S. stocks, reports on the U.S. economy, manages portfolios of U.S. assets, and then sells
their products to American investors.
A second mechanism that might preserve a home information advantage is a higher cost of
processing foreign information. While foreign information is likely harder to learn, this cost differ-
ence must be large to account for the magnitude of the home bias.7 Since there is no theory to
7The technical appendix computes this required cost.
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predict information costs and they are not observable, it is desirable for a theory not to rely on
the magnitude of the cost difference. Instead, the model in the next section requires an arbitrarily
small initial information advantage, possibly generated by a small cost difference, to endogenously
create a large home bias.
III Main Results
The previous section illustrated how information asymmetry could disappear. This section analyzes
a model where small differences in investors’ information not only persist, but are magnified. The
only change in the setup is that investors do not take their asset demand, or the asset demand
of other investors, to be fixed. Instead, we apply rational expectations: every investor takes into
account that every portfolio in the market depends on what each investor learns. We conclude that
home investors can learn foreign information, but choose not to. They achieve higher expected
utility from specializing in what they already know.
A The Period-2 Portfolio Problem
We solve the model using backward induction, starting with the optimal portfolio decision, taking
information choices as given. Given posterior mean µˆj and variance Σ̂j of asset payoffs, the portfolio
for investor j, from either country, is
qj =
1
ρ
(Σ̂j)−1(µˆj − pr). (7)
Aggregating these asset demands across investors and imposing market clearing delivers a solution
for the equilibrium asset price level that is linear in the asset payoff f and the unexpected component
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of asset supply x: p = 1r (A+ f + Cx). Appendix B derives formulas for A and C.
B The Optimal Learning Problem
In period 1, the investor chooses information to maximize expected utility. In order to impose
rational expectations, we substitute the equilibrium asset demand (7), into expected utility (1).
Combining terms yields
U = E
[
1
2
(µˆj − pr)′(Σ̂j)−1(µˆj − pr)|µ,Σ
]
. (8)
At time 1, (µˆj−pr) is a normal variable, so that U s the mean of a chi-squared distributed random
variable. The separate appendix shows that we can rewrite the period-1 objective as:
max
Λˆj
∑
i
(
Λpi + (ρΓ′ix¯Λˆ
a
i )
2
)
(Λˆji )
−1 s.t. (3) and (4) (9)
where Λpi is the ith eigenvalue of Σp, and Λˆai ≡ (
∫
j(Λˆ
j)−1)−1 is the posterior variance of risk factor
i for a hypothetical average investor.
The key feature of the learning problem (9) is its convexity in the posterior variance (Λˆj).
To illustrate, consider a setting with one risk factor in each country, where the objective is U =
L1/Λˆ1+L2/Λˆ2 for positive scalars L1 and L2. Thus, an indifference curve is Λˆ2 = L2Λˆ1/(U Λˆ1−L1),
which asymptotes to ∞ at Λˆ1 = L1/U > 0. The capacity constraint is Λˆ2 = K/Λˆ1, which
asymptotes to∞ at Λˆ1 = 0. Because the indifference curve is always crossing the capacity constraint
from below, the solution is always a corner solution.
Figure 1 plots the indifference curve (for L1 = L2), the capacity constraint, and the no-negative
learning bounds for our model (left panel) and the exogenous-portfolio model in section 2 (right
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Figure 1: Objective and constraints in the optimal learning problem with 2 risk factors.
panel). Utility increases as the indifference curve (dark line) moves toward the origin (variance
falls). All feasible learning choices must lie on or above the capacity constraint (lighter line). The
no-negative learning constraint prohibits posterior variances from exceeding prior variances (dashed
lines). The set of learning choices that satisfy both constraints is the shaded area. Whenever foreign
prior variance is higher than home prior variance, as in the figure, the solution in our model is to
devote all capacity to reducing home asset risk (the large dot in the left panel). In the model of
section 2 (right panel), the objective is linear and the optimum is to reduce variance on home and
foreign assets until their posterior variances are equal. The right panel shows why shutting down
the information-portfolio interaction reverses our main conclusion.
The following proposition states that each investor j uses his entire capacity K to learn about
one risk factor’s payoff f ′Γi. The risk factor the investor chooses to devote his capacity to has the
highest value of the learning index.
Definition. Investor j’s learning index for risk factor i is Lji ≡ (ρΛˆai Γ′ix¯)2((Λji )−1 + Λ−1pi ) + ΛpiΛji .
Proposition 2. Optimal Information Acquisition. The optimal information allocation deci-
sion for each investor j takes the following form: Λˆjk = Λ
j
k for all k 6= i and Λˆji < Λji for risk factor
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i, where i = argmax`=1,··· ,N
{
Lj`
}
.
Three features make a particular risk factor i desirable to learn about. First, the larger the risk
factor, measured by the supply (Γ′ix¯)
2, the higher its learning index. Since one piece of information
can be used more profitably to evaluate one hundred shares of an asset than one share, information
has increasing returns, and the investor gains more from learning about a risk that is abundant.
Second, the investor should learn about a risk factor that the average investor is uncertain about
(high Λˆai ). These risk factors have prices that reveal less information (high Λpi), and have higher
expected returns: Γ′iE[f − pr] = ρΛˆai Γ′ix¯. (See appendix B for a derivation.) Third, and most
importantly for the point of the paper, the investor should learn about risk factors that he has less
initial uncertainty about, relative to the average investor (high Λˆai /Λi). Since these are the assets
he will expect to hold more of, these are more valuable to learn about.
The feedback effects of learning and investing can be seen in the learning index. The amount
of a risk factor that an investor j expects to hold, based on his prior and price information, is
the factor’s expected return, divided by variance: ρΛˆai Γ
′
ix¯((Λ
j
i )
−1 + Λ−1pi ). This expected portfolio
holding shows up in the learning index formula, indicating that a higher expected portfolio share
increases the value of learning about the risk factor. Expecting to learn more about the risk factor
lowers the posterior variance Λˆji . Re-computing the expected portfolio holding with variance Λˆ
j
i ,
instead of ((Λji )
−1+Λ−1pi )
−1, further increases factor i’s portfolio share, and feeds back to increase i’s
learning index. This interaction between the learning choice and the portfolio choice, an endogenous
feature of the model, generates increasing returns to specialization.
Strategic Substitutability Because other investors’ learning lowers the posterior uncertainty Λˆai
and the informativeness of prices Λpi for the risk factors i they learn about, each investor prefers
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to learn about risk factors that other investors do not learn about: ∂L
j
i
Λˆai
> 0. This is strategic
substitutability. Let Ih be the set of risk factors that home investors learn about. Since all home
investors are ex-ante identical, each home investor j is indifferent between learning about any of
these risk factors: Lji = Ljk for any i, k ∈ Ih. There is another such set of risk factors If for foreign
investors. The number of risk factors in each set depends on country-wide information capacity.
Despite their indifference, the incentive to specialize ensures that each investor will learn about only
one risk factor. While a given investor can learn about any single asset in his indifference set in
equilibrium, strategic substitutability ensures that the aggregate allocation of capacity is unique.8
Learning and Information Asymmetry The effect of an initial information advantage on
learning is similar to the effect of a comparative advantage on trade. Home investors always have
a higher learning index than foreigners do for home risks, and vice-versa for foreign risks. If home
risks are particularly valuable to learn about, for example because those risks are large (high Γ′ix¯),
some foreigners may choose to learn about them. But, if home risks are valuable to learn about,
all home investors will specialize in them. Likewise, if some home investors learn about foreign
risks, then all foreigners must be specializing in foreign risks as well. The one pattern the model
rules out is that home investors learn about foreign risk and foreigners learn about home risk.
This is analogous to the principle of comparative advantage: If country A has an advantage in
producing apples and country B an advantage in bananas, the one production pattern that is not
possible is that country A produces bananas and B apples. Investors never make up for their initial
information asymmetry by each learning about the others’ advantage. Instead, posterior beliefs
8For proofs of strategic substitutability and equilibrium uniqueness, see section A of the technical appendix. In
what follows, we consider a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium where, for each risk factor i and any two investors
j, j′, if Lji ≥ Lj
′
i then the probability that investor j learns about i is at least as high as the probability that j
′ learns
about i.
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diverge, relative to priors; information asymmetry is amplified.
Let Λh (Λ∗h) denote home (foreign) investors’ prior variance for an arbitrary home risk factor
h, and let Λˆh (Λˆ∗h) denote the average home (foreign) investor’s posterior variance for h.
Proposition 3. Learning Amplifies Information Asymmetry. For every home risk factor
h, Λˆ−1h − (Λˆ∗h)−1 ≥ Λ−1h − (Λ∗h)−1.
A special case of this result arises when home and foreign countries are perfectly symmetric:
They have an equal number of risk factors of equal size with equal payoff variances. In this case,
home investors learn exclusively about home risks and foreign investors learn exclusively about
foreign risks. This result follows directly from the learning index in proposition 2. An investor
with no information advantage would have identical learning indices for home and foreign risks.
Thus, he would be indifferent between learning about home and foreign risks. Since investors with
no information advantage are indifferent, any initial advantage in home risk i (lower Λji in the
learning index) breaks that indifference, tilts preferences toward learning more about home risk
and amplifies the initial advantage.
At the other extreme, with very asymmetric markets, amplification disappears. If the home
market is much smaller than the foreign market, the learning index for the foreign risk factors
would be much higher for both the home and the foreign investor, and all investors optimally learn
about foreign risk factors. The ratio of home and foreign investors’ posterior precisions will then
be the same as the ratio of their prior precisions. The initial advantage is just preserved.
For all intermediate cases, posterior belief differences between foreign and home investors about
home assets are greater than prior belief differences. This leads us to conclude that learning
amplifies the initial information advantage.
19
C Home Bias in Investors’ Portfolios
To understand the effect of learning on home bias, we compare our model’s predictions to two
benchmark portfolios. The first portfolio would arise as the optimal portfolio in an economy with
no information advantage and no capacity to learn. Home investors and foreign investors have
identical beliefs and hold identical portfolios, which depend on the random asset supply. The
expected portfolio is the per capita expected supply: E[qdiv] = x¯. It is the world market portfolio,
the perfectly diversified portfolio of home and foreign assets.
A second natural benchmark portfolio is one where investors have initial information advantages
and can process the information in prices, but cannot acquire signals: E[qno learn] = Γ((Λj)−1 +
Λ−1p )(
1
2Λ
−1+ 12(Λ
∗)−1+Λ−1p )−1Γ′x¯, for an investor j.9 For comparison, note that the no-advantage
portfolio can be written as E[qdiv] = ΓIΓ′x¯. What makes the no-learning portfolio different from
the no-advantage portfolio is the initial information advantage: (Λj)−1 6= 12Λ−1 + 12(Λ∗)−1. The
no-learning portfolio tilts away from the world market portfolio towards the risk factors that the
investor has an initial advantage in. For example, this is the kind of information advantage that
Ahearne et al. (2004) capture when they estimate the home bias that uncertainty about foreign
accounting standards could generate.
The optimal expected portfolio with information acquisition takes the form:
E[q] = ΓΛˆ−1ΛˆaΓ′x¯ (10)
Specialization in learning does not imply specialization in portfolio holdings. Even if an investor
only learns about one home risk factor, he still holds all other assets for diversification purposes.
9Section A of the separate appendix derives all portfolio expressions.
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Each investor j’s optimal portfolio takes the world market portfolio (x¯) and tilts it towards the
assets i that he knows more about than the average investor (high (Λˆji )
−1Λˆai ).
Let Γ¯h be a sum of the eigenvectors in Γ which correspond to the home risk factors. Then Γ¯′hq
quantifies how much total home risk an investor is holding in his portfolio.
Definition. The home bias in a portfolio q is the difference between the home risk exposure in q
and in the diversified portfolio: Hj(q) ≡ E[Γ¯′jq]−E[Γ¯′jqdiv], for an investor j ∈ {h, f}.
The final proposition shows that the home bias in the optimal portfolio (10) exceeds the home
bias in the no-learning portfolio.
Proposition 4. Learning Increases Home Bias. The home bias is larger when investors can
learn than when they cannot: Hj(q) ≥ Hj(qno learn), for an investor j ∈ {h, f}.
Learning has two effects on an investors’ portfolio. First, it magnifies the asset position and
second, it tilts the portfolio towards the assets learned about. The first effect can be seen in (10):
Learning increases the precision of beliefs Λˆ−1 > Λ−1+Λ−1p . Lower risk in factor i makes investors
want to take larger positions in i, positive or negative. But why should the position in home assets
be a large long position, rather than a large short one? The second effect is an equilibrium effect.
The return on an asset compensates the average investor for the amount of risk he bears Λˆai . The
fact that foreign investors are investing in home assets without knowing much about them (typically
as part of a diversified portfolio), raises Λˆa and thus the asset’s return. Home investors j are being
compensated for more risk than they bear (Λˆai > Λˆ
j
i ). In other words, the home assets deliver high
risk-adjusted returns. High returns make a long position optimal, on average. Both the magnitude
and the general equilibrium effect increase home bias.10
10 It is possible that a highly negative signal realization on a home asset would make home investors who are
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IV Bringing the Theory to Data
There are a number of recent papers that present alternative explanations for home bias. Some
of these explanations are behavioral: Huberman (2001) explores familiarity, Cohen (2007) explores
loyalty, Morse and Shive (2008) propose patriotism, while Graham, Harvey and Huang (2006)
investigate overconfidence. Other argue, like this paper does, that home bias is the outcome of
rational investor choice: Cole, Mailath and Postlewaite (2001) and DeMarzo, Kaniel and Kremer
(2004) claim that investors have preference-based or market-price-based incentives to hold portfolios
similar to their neighbors’. At the same time, there has been an active literature that attempts to
distinguish between the various theories by documenting facts related to the home bias. While each
fact taken alone may be explained by alternative theories, it is difficult to find one parsimonious
theory that can explain a large set of facts. Rather than adding new facts, this section taps
in to the existing empirical literature and connects the theory to the evidence, qualitatively and
quantitatively (sections A and B). It also reconciles existing facts that appear to be at odds with
an information explanation (section C) and offers new predictions to guide future empirical work
(section D).
A Facts That Support Model Predictions
Direct Evidence of Information Asymmetry Bae, Stulz and Tan (2008) measure information
asymmetry and link it to home bias. They show that home analysts in 32 countries make more
precise earnings forecasts for home stocks than foreign analysts do. On average, the increase in
precision is 8%. Furthermore, the size of the home analyst advantage is related to home bias.
informed want to short that asset. Short selling is unlikely to occur on a large scale in general equilibrium, however.
The dramatic fall in prices from widespread shorting would signal the bad news to foreign investors, making them
unwilling to take the opposite large long positions. Low prices would also make home investors more willing to hold
home assets, despite their low payoffs.
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When local analysts’ forecasts are more precise relative to foreigners’ forecasts (more information
asymmetry), foreign investors hold less of that country’s assets.
Guiso and Jappelli (2006) examine survey data on the time customers of a leading Italian bank
spend acquiring financial information. Those who spend more time on information collection hold
portfolios that are less diversified and earn significantly higher returns.
Local Bias Home bias is not just a country-level effect. Investors also favor local assets, headquar-
tered near their home, over firms in the same country located further away (Coval and Moskowitz
(2001)). A unified explanation for home and local bias is something that many theories cannot
provide. Their coexistence makes an information-based explanation appealing. Malloy (2005) offers
direct evidence that local analysts do in fact have information advantages. He shows that local
analysts’ forecasts better predict stock returns and that they earn abnormal returns on their local
assets. By giving investors slightly more precise initial information about local assets, this model
can explain the local bias.
Suppose that home investors each had an advantage in only one home risk factor, the one
most concentrated in their region’s asset. An investor j from region m draws an independent prior
belief µj ∼ N(f,Σm), where Σm = ΓΛmΓ, and Λm has a mth diagonal entry that is lower than
it is for investors from other regions. In this model, local investors have an incentive to learn
more about their local assets, because of their initial information advantage (proposition 2). Local
advantages also amplify the effects of home advantages: When fewer investors share an advantage
in the same local risk, locals have a larger advantage relative to the average investor (higher
Λˆam/Λ
j
m in the learning index). A more specialized advantage magnifies the optimal portfolio bias
(E[Γ′mq] = Λˆam/Λ
j
m(Γ′mx¯)). Because returns to specialization increase when information advantages
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are more concentrated, investors diversify less. We illustrate this amplification effect in section B.
Industry Bias One source of prior information advantages could be one’s industry. If so, in-
vestors should reinforce that information asymmetry by learning more about that industry and
investing more in it. Massa and Simonov (2006) confirm this prediction. They show that Swedish
investors buy assets closely related to their non-financial income. Two facts make the authors con-
clude that the portfolio bias could be information-driven. When an investor changes industries, his
holdings of assets in that industry decline. More importantly, “familiarity-based” portfolios yield
higher returns than diversified ones.
Another source of prior information is one’s classmates. Cohen, Frazzini and Malloy (2007) find
that fund managers over-invest in firms run by their former classmates and make excess returns on
those investments. This is consistent with an initial information advantage acquired in school.
Under-diversified Foreign Investment One feature of portfolio data that is difficult to explain
is the concentration within the foreign component of home investors’ portfolios. The part of a
portfolio invested in any given foreign country should therefore be diversified. Kang & Stulz (1997)
show that this is not the case. Using data on foreign investors in Japan, they show that foreigners’
portfolios of Japanese assets overweight large firms and assets whose returns correlate highly with
aggregate risk.
This pattern is consistent with our model. Suppose than an American investor chooses to learn
about and invest in Japanese assets. Holding equal the average uncertainty (Λˆa), noise in prices
(Λp) and American prior uncertainty (Λ) about each Japanese risk, the most valuable risk to reduce
is the one with the largest quantity (highest Γix¯ in proposition 2). In other words, the American
should learn about the largest risk factors, aggregate macroeconomic risk and the risks associated
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with the largest firms. Since investors, on average, hold more of the assets they’ve learned about,
the model predicts that Americans who hold Japanese assets will not diversify their Japanese
holdings. Instead, they will overweight large, high-beta firms.
Portfolio Out-performance If transaction costs or behavioral biases are responsible for under-
diversification, then concentrated portfolios should deliver no additional profit. In contrast, if
investors in our model concentrate their portfolios, it is because they have informational advantages.
Their concentrated portfolios should out-perform diversified ones.11
There is empirical evidence for such out-performance. Ivkovic, Sialm and Weisbenner (2007)
find that concentrated investors outperform diversified ones by as much as 3% per year. Out-
performance is even higher for investments in local stocks, where natural informational asymmetries
are most likely to be present (see also Coval and Moskowitz (2001), Massa and Simonov (2006)
and Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005)). If fund managers have superior information about stocks in
particular industries, they should outperform in these industries. Kacperczyk, Sialm and Zheng
(2005) show that funds with above-median industry concentration yield an average return that is
1.1% per year higher than those with below-median concentration.
The model also predicts that home investors should out-perform foreign investors on home
assets. Choe, Kho and Stulz (2005) document home asset out-performance by Korean investors.
While one might think that this is only true for individual investors, Hau (2001) documents excess
German-asset returns for professional traders in Germany. Similarly, Shukla and van Inwegen
(1995) document that US mutual funds earn higher returns on US assets than UK funds do.
Dvorak (2007) argues that Indonesian investors outperform foreigners on Indonesian assets, even
11On-line technical appendix C proves that concentrated portfolios achieve higher expected returns. It also uses
the theory to interpret measures of portfolio risk.
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when that investment is intermediated by a professional.
Cross-sectional Asset Returns Investors want to learn information others do not know because
assets that many other investors learn about have high prices and low expected returns. Thus a
falsifiable prediction of the model is its negative relationship between information and expected
returns. Three studies confirm this prediction. First, Botosan (1997) and Easley, Hvidkjaer and
O’Hara (2002) find that more public information lowers an asset’s return. Second, Pastor and
Veronesi (2003) find that firms with more abundant historical data offer lower returns. Finally,
Greenstone, Oyer and Vissing-Jorgenson (2006) analyze a mandatory disclosure law that changed
a group of firms from being low-information to high-information. They find that between proposal
and passage of the law, prices of the most affected firms rose, producing abnormal excess returns of
11-22%. After passage, excess returns disappeared. Our model only speaks to the last example by
way of a comparative static: firms with more public information have a lower Λˆa and higher prices.
It seems conceivable that a dynamic extension of the model could generate a slow information
diffusion process during which stock prices gradually increase.
B Quantitative Evaluation: Is capacity large enough?
A key unobserved variable in the model is the investor’s capacity, which regulates how much he can
learn. This exercise infers capacity from estimates of portfolio out-performance. The test is: Does
this inferred level of capacity deliver observed home bias? This is a useful test because it tells us
if home bias is rationalized by profit-maximization. Before proceeding, we first explore how asset
correlation and local information affect the optimal degree of home bias.
Two countries have 1000 identical investors each. The 5 home and 5 foreign assets are all
uncorrelated. Foreigners start out α times more uncertain about home risks (1 + α)Λh = Λ?h, and
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home investors are α times more uncertain about foreign risks Λf = (1+α)Λ?f . We consider a 10%
information advantage (α = 0.1). Risk aversion is ρ = 2. The supply of each asset has mean x¯
=100 and standard deviation 10. Expected payoffs for home and foreign assets are equal. They
are equally spaced between 1 and 2. The mean of the average investor’s prior belief is the asset’s
true payoff. The standard deviation of prior beliefs is between 15-30%, such that all assets have
the same prior expected payoff to standard deviation ratio. To explore various levels of capacity,
we transform K into a more intuitive measure: K˜ = 1−K−1/2 is how much an investor can reduce
the standard deviation of one asset through learning. Following convention, home bias is
home bias = 1− 1− share of home asset in home portfolio
share of foreign assets in world portfolio
. (11)
In this example, as in the data, the share of foreign assets in the world portfolio is 0.5. In a world
where there is no initial information advantage and no learning capacity, home bias is zero. We
use an economy with an initial information advantage, but no learning capacity as a benchmark.
A 10% initial information advantage by itself generates a 5.3% home bias.
With uncorrelated assets, a home investor acquires information about one home asset and over-
weights that asset in his portfolio. When capacity can eliminate 22% of the standard deviation in
one asset (K˜ = .22), home bias is 10%, almost double its no-learning level. When K˜ = .70, home
bias is 45%, more than eight times larger than the home bias without learning.
Asset Correlation Increases Home Bias Moderate correlation increases home bias because
several home assets load on the one risk factor the investor learns about. When the investor has
better information about more home assets, he tilts his portfolio more towards home risk. When
home assets are positively correlated with each other, and foreign assets are positively correlated
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with each other (correlations of 10-30%), but the two sets of assets are mutually uncorrelated, home
bias doubles to 19.4% for K˜ = .22. It increases to 59.5% for K˜ = .70. (See line with circles in
figure 2.) In contrast, the no learning benchmark is unaffected (5.3%, line with diamonds). With
K˜ = .82, home bias is 72%, just shy of the 76% in the data.
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Figure 2: Home Bias Increases With Capacity. Assets within a country have correlated payoffs (cov= .092). Home
bias is defined in (11). The ‘no advantage’ line (stars) is an economy with no initial informational advantage and no capacity
to learn. The ‘no learning’ economy (diamonds) has a small initial information advantage (10%) and no learning capacity. The
‘learning’ line (circles) is our model. Learning capacity K varies between 1.1 and 30. The horizontal axis plots K˜, the potential
percentage reduction in the standard deviation of one asset (K˜ = 1−K−1/2).
Local Information Increases Home Bias We use the same numerical example with corre-
lated assets, except that instead of giving 1000 home (foreign) investors a 10% initial information
advantage in all 5 home (foreign) assets, we give 200 investors each a 50% advantage in one asset;
the aggregate information advantages at home and abroad are unchanged. We measure local bias
as in (11), treating localities like countries. With capacity K˜ = 0.70, local bias is 30%. The average
local investor holds 3.6 times what a diversified investor would hold, of his local asset.
Concentrating information advantages in local assets increases home bias. Without learning,
the home bias is 8%; with low capacity (K˜ = 0.22), it is 23%. With more capacity (K˜ = 0.70),
home bias is 76%. This is 16.5% more than in in the previous case and matches the 76% home bias
in the data. The underlying capacity level K that matches the home bias in the local-advantage
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model is 3 times smaller than in the home country advantage model.
Inferring the level of capacity Portfolio out-performance provides clues about how much
private information investors have. Ivkovic et al. (2007) use brokerage account data to show that
individuals investors with concentrated portfolios earn 10% higher risk-adjusted annual returns on
local, non-S&P500 stocks than investors with diversified portfolios. Since the previous exercises
show that correlated asset payoffs and local information advantages are important amplifiers of
home bias, we continue with both assumptions.
To link the model to data, we equate the largest risk-factor in the home country (80% of
market capitalization) with S&P500 stocks (73% of US market capitalization). For the non-S&P
risk factors, we compare expected returns of local investors, who learn about the local asset, and
non-local investors. For the level of capacity that matches the empirical home bias (K˜ = .70), local
investors’ return on the smaller risk factors is 5% higher than what non-locals earn. The model
can match Ivkovic et al. (2007)’s 10% result for K˜ = .75. This inference suggests that the level of
capacity required to match the home bias is not implausibly large.
Ivkovic et al. (2007) focus on non-S&P500 stocks because their informational asymmetries are
potentially the largest. They also report insignificant out-performance on the S&P500 assets. While
our model cannot speak to the statistical significance of their results, it does qualitatively match
the pattern of lower out-performance on larger assets. For the calibration that matches the home
bias, local investors’ return on the largest risk factor (S&P500 assets) is only 2% higher than what
non-locals earn. Returns fall on large assets because their size makes them valuable to learn about.
Low average uncertainty about the risks makes equilibrium returns and out-performance low.
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C Seemingly Contradictory Evidence
We discuss two facts that are inconsistent with the version of our model outlined so far. We show
that both facts can be explained if we allow for asymmetric capacity. Asymmetric capacity is
defined as heterogeneity in the parameter K across investors. For this section, we think of two
countries, a developed and an emerging market. We assume that capacity is homogenous across
investors within the country. This heterogeneity in capacity across countries captures the more
developed financial analysis sectors in developed economies.
Foreign Out-performance in Emerging Markets Using foreign investment data from Tai-
wan, Seasholes (2004) finds that foreign investors outperform the Taiwanese market, particularly
in assets that are large and highly correlated with the macro-economy. He argues that “The re-
sults point to foreigners having better information processing abilities, especially regarding macro-
fundamentals.” This conclusion leads us to ask two questions of our model.
Question 1: If Taiwanese investors have lower capacity than Americans, might Americans invest
in Taiwanese assets and outperform the market? Recall that expected returns are determined by
Λˆa. If Americans have more capacity, they will reduce the average posterior variance for American
assets by more: Λˆahi < Λˆ
a?
fi , for equally-sized home and foreign risks hi and fi. Therefore, expected
returns for US assets will be lower than for Taiwanese assets. A large enough difference in returns
will induce some Americans to invest in Taiwan and learn about Taiwan. If Americans have
capacity that exceeds Taiwanese capacity, and the capacity gap exceeds their initial disadvantage
in a Taiwanese risk factor, then Americans can become the best informed of any investor about
that risk factor. Being best informed, the American will out-perform the average investor in assets
that load on that factor.
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Question 2: Will American excess returns be concentrated in those Taiwanese assets that load
heavily on the largest risk factors? Since section A shows that foreign investors learn about large
assets with high market covariance, these are the Taiwanese assets American should out-perform
on. Thus, an asymmetric capacity version of the model can reconcile high-capacity investors’ out-
performance at home, with their out-performance in emerging markets, for large high-beta assets.
The declining home bias The previous results imply that a rise in learning capacity K should
increase home bias. At first glance, these results seem to suggest that home bias should increase
over time. If anything, the data point to a modest decline in the U.S. home bias. However, only
a symmetric increase in capacity unambiguously increases home bias. If home investors’ capacity
increases more and home investors learn about home assets, then Λˆai will fall for home risk factors
i. This depresses home asset returns and home learning indices ( ∂Li
∂Λˆai
> 0), which may induce
some home investors to learn about and hold more foreign equity. While this model can only make
static predictions, these predictions suggest that a dynamic model with an asymmetric increase in
capacity could reduce the average investor’s home bias.
Furthermore, capital flow liberalization and increases in equity listings in the last 30 years have
increased investible foreign risk factors (Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2003)). The investors in
our model would add these risk factors to the diversified part of their portfolio (x¯). This effect
would also increase foreign equity investment and reduce home bias.
D A New Direction for Estimating Information
The fact that investors’ information is inherently unobservable is an obstacle to assessing asymmet-
ric information theories. One solution is to use proxies for investors’ information, like the precision
of earnings forecasts. But for many classes of investors, such proxies are not available. Our theory
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offers another solution. It delivers information sets as equilibrium outcomes. Observable features of
assets predict information patterns, which in turn, predict observable portfolios, analyst behavior
and pricing errors. This makes for testable hypotheses. A contribution of this paper is that it
brings information-based theories to the data.
The novel part of this theory is the link it establishes between observable asset characteristics
and the average investor’s information, through the learning index. The following algorithm could
be used to estimate learning indices: (i) Compute the eigen-decomposition (principal components)
of asset payoffs. Payoffs are the dividend paid between t and t + 1 plus the price at t + 1: ft =
dt + pt+1. Post-multiply asset prices and payoffs by the eigenvector matrix Γ, to form risk factor
prices and payoffs. Risk factor returns are Γ′(ft − rpt). (ii) Construct unconditional (prior) risk
factor Sharpe ratios: Divide each risk factor’s average return by its standard deviation. (iii)
Estimate the coefficient ΛB from a regression of risk factor prices (Γ′p) on a constant and risk factor
payoffs (Γ′f) – the risk factor counterpart to the price equation (15). Attributing the residual to
asset supply shocks, the residual variance is Λ2Cσ
2
x. One minus that regression’s R
2 is Λpi/Λi for
an investor whose prior belief is based on past realizations of returns.12 (iv) Use the definition
preceding proposition 2 to form each risk factor’s learning index. (v) Pre-multiply the vector of
risk factor indices by the eigenvector matrix Γ. The resulting vector contains learning indices for
each asset. This procedure could also be applied to price and return indices across countries.
Learning indices could be used to test many aspects of the theory. (1) They should predict
information-related variables such as analyst coverage. (2) Countries, regions or firms with higher
learning indices should have lower returns, relative to what a standard model like the CAPM
12To derive the link between the regression R2 and the learning index, manipulate (17) to get C = −ρΣaη. Square
this equation and use (13) to get C2σ2x = Σp. Since C
2σ2x is the unexplained sum of squares in the price regression
and Σ is the total variance in prices, the regression (1−R2) is Σ−1Σp, for assets and Λpi/Λi for risk factor i.
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predicts. This is because assets with higher learning indices are ones that the average investor
learns more about and thus is less uncertain about. Lower uncertainty Λˆai implies a lower return.
(3) Finally, a country or region’s learning index should be related to the home bias of its residents’
portfolios. This relationship is non-monotonic. If the learning index is near zero, no one, not even
locals learn about home risk. When all investors learn about foreign risk, there is only a small
home bias that comes from initial information differences. As the home learning index grows, more
home investors specialize in home risks. Information asymmetry and home bias rise. In the limit,
as the home learning index grows very large, both home and foreign investors study home risks.
Again, the small home bias comes only from the small differences in initial information. Because
home bias depends on comparative information advantage, it is strongest for an intermediate level
of the learning index.
V Conclusions
This paper studies a common criticism of information-based models of the home bias: If home
investors have less information about foreign stocks, why don’t they choose to acquire foreign infor-
mation, reduce their uncertainty about foreign payoffs, and undo their portfolio bias? The answer
to this question requires a model where investors choose which risky asset payoffs to learn about.
We show that investors who do not account for the effect of learning on portfolio choice, choose
to undo their initial advantages. But, investors with rational expectations reinforce informational
asymmetries. Investors learn more about risks they have an advantage in because they want their
information to be very different from what others know. Thus our main message is that informa-
tion asymmetry assumptions are defensible, but not for the reason originally thought. We do not
need cross-border information frictions. With sufficient capacity to learn, small initial information
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advantages can lead to a home bias of the magnitude observed in the data.
A problem that many asymmetric information theories face is that unobservable information
makes them difficult to evaluate empirically. While information cannot be observed, it can be
predicted. A separate contribution of our paper is to connect the observed features of assets
to predictions about investors’ information sets. This connection provides a new way to bring
information-based theories to the data.
An important assumption in our model is that every investor must process his own information.
But paying one portfolio manager to learn for many investors is efficient. How might such a setting
regenerate a home bias? Because monitoring information collection is difficult, portfolio managers
have an incentive to lie about how much research they do. Investors may want to occasionally audit
portfolio managers. Having a manager from the same region, with similar initial information, is
advantageous because checking the manager’s work requires less capacity. Portfolio managers with
the same initial information advantage as their clients form the same optimal portfolio as would a
client who processed information himself. This optimal portfolio is home biased. Future work could
use the framework in this model to build an equilibrium model of delegated portfolio management.
The broader message of our paper is that investors choose to have different information sets.
The standard asset pricing and portfolio choice models typically assume symmetric information sets
across agents. Our paper shows that these models are subject to an important criticism: Investors
have an incentive to deviate by learning information that others do not know.
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Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1
The optimization problem is maxΛˆ
∑
i q˜
2Λˆi s.t. Λˆi ≤ Λi and
∏
i Λˆi ≥
∏
i Λi
1
K , where q˜ = Γ
′
iq, ∀i. The
first-order condition for this problem is q˜2 − υ 1
Λˆi
∏
l Λˆl + φi = 0 where υ is the Lagrange multiplier on the
capacity constraint and φi is the Lagrange multiplier on the no-negative-learning constraint for asset i. We
conjecture and then verify that if K > K?, the no negative learning constraint does not bind (φi = 0). This
implies that Λˆi = υq˜2K
∏
i Λi. Taking a product on both sides and imposing the capacity constraint yields
υ = q˜2 (K
∏
i Λi)
N−1
N . Substituting this in the first-order condition delivers Λˆi =
(
1
K
∏
i Λi
) 1
N ≡ M . Note
that M is monotonically decreasing in capacity K, which verifies our conjecture.
The cutoff capacity level K? solves mini{Λi} =
(
1
K?
∏
i Λi
) 1
N . The result that Λˆi = min {Λi,M} for
K < K? follows from imposing the no-negative learning constraint, which states that if φi > 0 then Λˆi = Λi.
B Equilibrium Asset Prices
Let Σηj be the variance-covariance matrix of the private signals that investor j chooses to observe. The
following three precision matrices are useful in deriving the pricing function. (Σaη)
−1 is the average precision
of investors’ information advantage, plus the average precision of the information they choose to learn. (Σp)−1
is the precision of prices as a signal about true payoffs. (Σ̂a)−1 is the average of all investors’ posterior belief
precisions, taking into account priors, signals and prices.
(Σaη)
−1 = Γ(Λaη)−1Γ′ =
1
2
Σ−1 +
1
2
(Σ?)−1 +
∫
j
(Σjη)
−1dj, (12)
(Σp)−1 = ΓΛ−1p Γ
′ =
1
ρ2σ2x
(ΣaηΣ
a′
η )
−1, (13)
(Σ̂a)−1 = ΓΛˆ−1a Γ
′ =
1
ρ2σ2x
(ΣaηΣ
a′
η )
−1 + (Σaη)
−1 (14)
We assumed that investors cannot not change the risk factor structure, implying Ση has eigenvectors Γ.
Since sums, products and inverses preserve eigenvectors, Σaη, Σp, and Σ̂a share the same eigenvectors as well.
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Setting asset demand
∫
j
qj equal to asset supply x¯+ x delivers the equilibrium price:
rp = A+ f + Cx where (15)
A = −ρ
(
1
ρ2σ2x
(ΣaηΣ
a′
η )
−1 + (Σaη)
−1
)−1
x¯, (16)
C = −
(
1
ρ2σ2x
(ΣaηΣ
a′
η )
−1 + (Σaη)
−1
)−1(
ρI +
1
ρσ2x
(Σaη)
−1′
)
. (17)
This result is almost identical to Admati (1985), except that Admati’s investors have common priors, while
we treat priors as though they were private signals.
This result delivers two useful expressions used in the text. First, C = −ρΣaη and therefore, CC ′σ2x =
ρ2σ2xΣ
a
ηΣ
a′
η = Σp. Second, expected risk factor returns are
Γ′iE[f − pr] = −Γ′iA = ρΓ′iΣˆax¯ = ρΓ′iΓΛˆaΓ′x¯ = ρ(Γ′ix¯)Λˆai , (18)
where the first equality follows from (15), the second from (14) and (16), the third from Σˆa = ΓΛˆaΓ′, and
the last equality follows from Γ′Γ = I.
C Proof of Proposition 2
We begin by redefining the objective in (9) as maxyji
∑
i
(
Λpi + (ρΓ′ix¯Λˆ
a
i )
2
)
((Λji )
−1 + Λ−1pi )y
j
i , where y
j
i
is the ratio of posterior precision to the precision of priors plus price information, about risk i for investor
j: (Λˆji )
−1/((Λji )
−1 + Λ−1pi ). The capacity constraint (3) is equivalent to (
∏
i yi)(
∏
i(Λ
−1
i + Λ
−1
pi )/Λ
−1
i ) ≤ K.
Then, define Kˆ to be the investors’ ‘spare capacity’ that is left over to be allocated after he processes
information in prices: Kˆ = K
∏
i Λ
−1
i /(Λ
−1
i +Λ
−1
pi ). The capacity constraint becomes
∏
i yi ≤ Kˆ. We endow
the investor with enough spare capacity to acquire private signals after devoting capacity to learning from
prices: Kˆ > 1. Finally, the no-negative-learning constraint (4) becomes yi ≥ 1 ∀i.
This problem maximizes a sum subject to a product constraint. The second order condition for this
problem is positive, meaning the optimum is a corner solution. A simple variational argument shows that the
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maximum is attained by maximizing the yi with the highest learning index
(
Λpi + (ρΓ′ix¯Λˆ
a
i )
2
)
((Λji )
−1+Λ−1pi ).
For all risk factors k that he does not learn about, the investor sets yk = 1.
D Proof of Proposition 3
Substituting the formula for posterior variances into the inequality in the proposition, Λ−1h + Λ
−1
ph + Λ
−1
ηh −
(Λˆ∗h)
−1 − Λ−1ph − (Λ∗ηh)−1 ≥ Λ−1ph − (Λ∗ηh)−1, where Λ−1ηh ((Λ∗ηh)−1) are the signal precision obtained by the
average home (foreign) investors about risk factor h. Cancelling terms yields Λ−1ηh ≥ (Λ∗ηh)−1.
Every home investor who learns about risk i gets signal precision Λ−1ηi = (Kˆ − 1)(Λ−1i +Λ−1pi ) and every
foreign investor who learns about i gets signal precision Λ−1ηi = (Kˆ − 1)((Λ∗i )−1 + Λ−1pi ). Since the initial
information advantage means that Λ−1i > (Λ
∗
i )
−1 for any home risk factor i, it also implies that Λ−1ηi > Λ
−1
ηi ,
if both investors learn about home risk factor i. Let ξh (ξ?h) be the probability that a home (foreign) investor
learns about some home risk h. Then the signal precision of the average home and foreign investor is ξiΛ−1ηi
and ξ∗i (Λ
∗
ηi)
−1. A sufficient condition for the average home signal precision to be larger than the average
foreign signal precision is if ξh ≥ ξ?h. The last step establishes this inequality.
The learning index for home risk factor h is always greater for a home investor: ΛphΛ−1h +(Λˆ
a
hΓ
′
hx¯)
2(Λ−1h +
Λ−1ph ) >
Λph
Λ?h
+ (Λˆ
a
h)
2
Λ?h
(Γ′hx¯)
2 because Λh = Λ?hα, for α < 1. Since we are looking at the symmetric mixed
strategy equilibrium (see footnote 8), this implies that ξh ≥ ξ?h, for every home risk factor h.
E Proof of Proposition 4
Using equation (10) and the definition of qno learn, we can write the difference in home bias for these two
portfolios. The optimal portfolio of investor j contains at least as much of some home risk factor i iff
(Λˆji )
−1Λˆa ≥ (Λ
j
i )
−1 + Λ−1pi
Λ−1i /2 + (Λ
∗
i )−1/2 + Λ
−1
pi
. (19)
Let ξi (ξ?i ) be the probability that a home (foreign) investor learns about some home risk i. Using
Bayes’ law (6) and averaging across investors, we can rewrite (Λˆai )
−1 = 1/2(Λ−1i + (Λ
∗
i )
−1) + Λ−1pi + ξi(Kˆ −
37
1)(Λ−1i +Λ
−1
pi )/2 + ξ
∗
i (Kˆ − 1)((Λ∗i )−1 +Λ−1pi )/2. Likewise, the average home posterior precision is (Λˆji )−1 =
(1+ξiKˆ)(Λ−1i +Λ
−1
pi ). Substituting these two equations into (19) and canceling terms yields 1+ξiKˆ ≥ 1+ξ?i Kˆ.
From the proof of proposition 3, we know that ξ ≥ ξ?i , for every home risk factor i. Since the learning
portfolio of a home investor contains at least much of every home risk factor as the no learning portfolio
does, E[Γ¯′hq] > E[Γ¯
′
hq
no learn]. By the same logic, E[Γ¯′fq] > E[Γ¯
′
fq
no learn] for a foreign investor.
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